We re-examine the reduction of Maurer and Wolf of the Discrete Logarithm problem to the Diffie-Hellman problem. We give a precise estimate for the number of operations required in the reduction and use this to estimate the exact security of the elliptic curve variant of the Diffie-Hellman protocol for various elliptic curves defined in standards.
Introduction
One of the oldest challenging problems in public key cryptography is to prove or disprove that the Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP) and the Diffie-Hellman Problem (DHP) are computationally equivalent. The hard part of the equivalence is showing that we can solve the DLP using a polynomial number of group operations and calls to a function which solves the DHP.
Significant steps have already been made towards the solution and the equivalence has been proved for some groups. Intuitively, it makes sense to use such groups for the Diffie-Hellman protocol (if of course no discrete logarithm algorithm is known for them), so that breaking the Diffie-Hellman protocol is as hard as computing logarithms, that is to say secure.
For most groups in use in cryptography, it is believed that the DHP and the DLP are equivalent in a complexity-theoretic sense; i.e. there is a polynomial time reduction of one problem to the other, and vice versa. Examples of groups that have been proposed for application in the Diffie-Hellman protocol are the multiplicative group of large finite fields (prime fields or extension fields), the multiplicative group of residues modulo a composite number, elliptic curves over finite fields, and the class group of imaginary quadratic fields.
Maurer and Wolf [6, 8, 7, 10] proved that for every group G with prime order p, the equivalence holds if we are able to find an elliptic curve over F p with smooth order. The aim of this paper is to show that for various elliptic curve groups recommended by standards, such an elliptic curve exists. To this end, we will use the technique of complex multiplication to construct elliptic curves with smooth order. The implementation of this algorithm has been carried out using the software package Magma. Definition 1. Let G be a finite cyclic group generated by g. The problem of computing from h ∈ G an integer x such that g x = h is called the discrete logarithm problem (DLP) with respect to g. Definition 2. Let G be a finite cyclic group generated by g. The problem of computing g ab from g a and g b is called the Diffie-Hellman problem (DHP) with respect to g.
It is easy to see that if one can solve the DLP, one can solve the DHP. Let g a and g b be in G. We compute a from g a and compute (g b ) a = g ab . Hence DLP ⇒ DHP . This paper focuses on the reverse reduction, namely DLP ⇐ DHP .
The equivalence we are interested in is a computational equivalence. Suppose that one day, the DHP turns out to be easy, i.e. a given instance of this problem can be solved in a reasonable time. We want to known if this implies that the DLP is easy as well, i.e. if there exists an effective algorithm for solving a given instance of the DLP by using a "small" number of operations and of calls to a function which solves the DHP. Such a function is called a DH-oracle: Now, what do we mean by a "small" number of operations and a "small" number of calls to the DH-oracle? The answer is a polynomial in log p, where p is the order of the group. Definition 4. Let G be a finite cyclic group with generator g of order |G| = p. Given h ∈ G, the DLP and the DHP are computationally equivalent if we are able to find the unique x modulo p such that h = g x , by using only:
• O (log p) O(1) calls to the DH-oracle.
For given elliptic curves defined in various standards we would like to show that the number of group operations and DH-oracle calls required to reduce the DLP to the DHP is small, i.e. less than say 2 n1 . This would imply that if we believe that no algorithm can solve the DLP in such groups in less than 2 n2 operations then any future algorithm for solving the DHP, and so breaking the DHP protocol, would require 2 n2−n1 operations. Hence, the smaller the value of n 1 , the tighter the security reduction.
Algorithm Overview
We first give an overview of the method by Maurer and Wolf [6] , which we shall use in our later calculations.
Let G be a cyclic group with generator g and whose order is a prime p. If a is an integer modulo p then the value of g a is said to be the implicit representation of a. The idea of the algorithm is to do computations in implicit representation. For example, to compute a + b (resp. a − b) in implicit form, we compute g a · g b (resp. g a · (g b ) −1 ) which costs only one multiplication (resp. and an inversion) in G. To compute a · b in implicit form, one call to the DH-oracle is needed. To compute a −1 in implicit form, one uses the fact that a p−1 = 1, so a p−2 = a −1 . Hence, one can perform any algebraic algorithm on the implicit representation. The following table sums up computations in implicit representation and their average complexities.
Explicit form
Implicit form Complexity
2 log p calls to the DH-oracle
The following result can be found in [6] and [10] . Theorem 1. Let G be a group. If each large prime factor p of |G| is single and if for every such p a cyclic elliptic curve over F p is known with smooth order then breaking DHP and DLP are equivalent for G.
Proof. For the sake of simplicity, let us assume that G = g with |G| = p prime. The elliptic curve E = E a,b (p) with parameters a and b in F p is the set
By a theorem of Rück [11] we can always choose a curve E, of a given order, such that E(F p ) is cyclic and generated by P . We assume we are given g x and we are asked to compute x. First, the group element
can be computed from g x by O(log a + log b) = O(log p) group operations and two calls to the DH oracle for G. If z = x 3 + ax + b is a quadratic residue mod p (which can be tested efficiently), then a group element g y can be computed such that y 2 ≡ z ≡ x 3 + ax + b mod p using an implicit version of the Tonelli-Shanks algorithm [5] .
If z is not a quadratic residue, g x can be replaced by g x+d for a random offset d until z is a quadratic residue. Testing the quadratic residuosity of z modulo p can be achieved with O(log p) applications to the DH-oracle, because z is a quadratic residue modulo p if and only if z (p−1)/2 ≡ 1 mod p, that is if and only if g
To simplify the discussion we shall assume that z is a quadratic residue and that using the Tonelli-Shanks algorithm we have computed
with x, y ∈ F p . The point Q = (x, y) is a point on the elliptic curve E. Since |E| is assumed to be smooth, we can use an implicit version of the Pohlig-Hellman algorithm to compute the discrete logarithm k of Q with respect to the generator P . Computing [k]P explicitly finally gives us x, as the abscissa of the point [k]P . For each prime factor q of |E| we proceed as follows.
From the generator P of E, the points
are computed for i = 0, 1, . . . , q − 1, and from (u i , v i ) we obtain the group elements (g ui , g vi ). Since the point (u, v) has order q and Q = [k]P , we conclude that
Similarly, k can be computed modulo the prime powers of the factorisation of |E|, and hence modulo |E|. From k, we compute [k]P = Q, and then x simply is the abscissa of the point Q.
If |E| is B-smooth, then the rough complexity of this method is
• O B · (log p) 2 group operations in G and field operations in F p ,
• O (log p) 3 calls to the DH-oracle for G.
A more accurate estimate of the complexities will be given later.
How long it takes to solve a given instance of the DLP
In this section, we want to find a precise estimate of how long it takes to solve a given instance of the DLP, that means how many calls to the DH-oracle and multiplications are required on average. We need to analyse precisely the method sketched in Section 3.
Let G be a cyclic group with generator g and prime order p. Given h ∈ G, we want to find the unique x modulo p such that h = g
x . The generalization with a composite order is possible, see Section 3, but is not necessary of practical importance, since the orders of all the groups recommended by standards are prime.
We assume that the parameters a and b of a cyclic elliptic curve E a,b (F p ) with smooth order are given. We assume that
with f j = 1 and q j < B for j = 1, . . . , s. Actually, the generalization with f j > 1 is possible using the analogy with the Pohlig-Hellman algorithm, but is not useful because in practice the multiple factors of |E| will always be small in comparison with the largest prime factor |E|. Therefore, we assume that |E| = s j=1 q j where all q j are not necessarily prime but are all less than the smoothness bound B. Write p − 1 = 2 e · w with w odd.
b ← g bs and go to Step 2.2.
3. Note Q := (x, y) is a point on E, however we only know the implicit representation (g x , g y ). For j from 1 to s, do the following:
For i from 0 to q j − 1, do the following:
On equality let k j := i and go to next iteration in j (or to Step 4 if j = s).
The standard binary exponentiation algorithm requires log 2 k squares and on average 1 2 log 2 k multiplications. We require this in two places:
x . Then, on average 3 2 log 2 k calls to the DH-oracle are needed.
• Given a point P on an elliptic curve, to compute kP = t i=0 k i (2 i P ). Then, on average 1 2 log 2 k additions of points and log 2 k doublings are needed. We now expand on the second of these subprocedures.
4.2.
Explicit and Implicit Point Multiplications 4.2.1. Doubling a point on an elliptic curve Let P = (x, y) and Q = 2P = (x , y ). Then:
2 +a 2y
In implicit representation, we know (g x , g y ) and we want to compute (g x , g y ) such that (x , y ) = 2(x, y).
Computing g λ requires 4 + 3 2 log 2 a multiplications, two calls to the DH-oracle and one DH-inversion 1 . If g λ is known, computing g x and g y requires four multiplications and three inversions in F p , and two calls to the DH-oracle. Finally, doubling a point on an elliptic curve requires:
In explicit form: Four multiplications and one inversion in F p .
In implicit form: 8+ 3 2 log 2 a multiplications and three inversions in F p , four calls to the DH-oracle and one DH-inversion.
Adding two points on an elliptic curve
Let P = (x 1 , y 1 ), Q = (x 2 , y 2 ) and R = P + Q = (x 3 , y 3 ). Then:
In implicit representation, we know (g x1 , g y1 ) and (g x2 , g y2 ), and we want to com-
Finally, adding two points on an elliptic curve requires:
In explicit form: Three multiplications and one inversion in F p .
In implicit form: Six multiplications and four inversions in F p , three calls to the DH-oracle and one DH-inversion.
Combining the above analyses we obtain that a scalar multiplication of a point on a curve requires the following number of operations.
In explicit form: Given a point P on an elliptic curve, computing explicitly the point kP requires on average:
• 11 log 2 k + 3 2 log 2 a multiplications in F p (we compute g a only once). 
Complexity
We are now in a position to evaluate precisely the complexity of the algorithm for reducing the DLP to the DHP.
Step 1
Step 1.1 : We compute g
This requires two calls to the DH-oracle and 2 + 2 non-quadratic residues. Let ν be the number of iterations for Step 1. The probability for having ν = k iterations is:
The average numberν of iterations for Step 1 is therefore:
Hence
Step 1 requires on average about:
• 4 + 3 log 2 a + • 1 + 3 log 2 p calls to the DH-oracle.
Step
calls to the DH-oracle.
Step 3 Let j be fixed.
Step 3.1 Using results of Section 4.2, Step 3.1 requires on average, for each value of j: Step 3.2 First we compute |E| qj · P , before entering into the loop in i. This requires on average Step 3.2.1 We use the fact that (u i+1 , v i+1 ) = (u i , v i ) + |E| qj · P . The cost is one addition on E, that is three multiplications and one inversion in F p .
Step 3.2.2 This step needs 3/2·(log 2 u i +log 2 v i ) multiplications in F p . If we consider that u i and v i are p/2 on average, then 3 log 2 p−3 multiplications are needed.
We can assume that on average, there are q j /2 iterations in the loop in i:
Step 3.2 requires on average, for one j:
Summing up for the whole of Stage 3 we have s j=1 log 2 |E| q j = (s − 1) · log 2 |E|.
Hence
Step 3 requires on average :
• 11(s − 1) 2 log 2 |E| calls to the DH-oracle.
• 3(s − 1) 2 log 2 |E| DH-inversions.
Step 4
Step 4.1 We use the Chinese Remainder Theorem to compute k mod |E|, knowing k ≡ k j mod q j , for each j ∈ {1, . . . , s}. Using Gauss algorithm:
with Q j = |E| qj and R j = Q −1 j mod q j . It requires 2s multiplications and s inversions in (F q1 , . . . , F qs ).
Step 4.2 We can consider that on average, k mod |E| = 
Conclusion
The algorithm needs on average:
• 15 2 + 9 2 log 2 p + 11(s − 1) 2 log 2 |E| calls to the DH-oracle.
We supposed that a > 0 and b > 0. If actually a < 0, we must add three inversions in F p and if b < 0, one inversion must be added. In the expressions above, many terms can be neglected. Moreover, the approximation log 2 |E| ≈ log 2 p can be done without loss of accuracy. We obtain:
• 11s 2 − 1 · log 2 p calls to the DH-oracle.
• 3(s − 1) 2 log 2 p DH-inversions.
Since an inversion can in general be computed in a field of large prime characteristic at a cost of at most 10 multiplications, and since a DH-inversion needs on average 3 2 log 2 p calls to the DH-oracle, we conclude Theorem 2. Let G a cyclic finite group of prime order p. Assume an elliptic curve E over F p has been found, whose B-smooth order is
Solving a given instance of the DLP in G requires on average about:
log B calls to the DH-oracle.
Using the Baby-Step/Giant-Step method to find k, as opposed to the exhaustive search method above, both complexities can be replaced by
Building a curve with appropriate order
We now turn to the problem of building a curve with a smooth group order over the field of p elements. According to [4] , the main techniques are:
• Generate random curves and compute their group orders, until an appropriate one is found.
• Generate curves with given group order using the theory of complexity multiplication (CM).
The genesis of the efficient general point counting algorithms lies in the work of Schoof [12] . The complexity of his algorithm is O(log 8 p). To improve the computational efficiency of the basic Schoof algorithm, several techniques have evolved, owing in large part to Atkin and Elkies, see [4] for details. The improvements to the basic Schoof algorithm are generally referred to as the Schoof-Elkies-Atkin (SEA) algorithm, whose running time is O(log 6 p). When the order of the random elliptic curve is known, it remains to check whether or not it is smooth.
To speed up the computations we preferred the CM method, since given a prime p it is very easy to generate a large number of possible group orders. To this end, we give a quick overview of the CM method for curve construction. If E is an elliptic curve over F p of order u, then
is positive by the Hasse bound. Thus there is a unique factorization:
where D is squarefree. So for each non-supersingular elliptic curve over F p of order u, there exists a unique squarefree integer D such that:
for some W and V . In this case the group order is given by
It is said that E has complex multiplication by D. The value D is called a CM discriminant for p. To find W and V in equation (1) one uses the algorithm of Cornacchia, see [4] for details. Once one has found values of W and V , and an associated CM discriminant D we can then build an elliptic curve with group order p + 1 ± W using the theory of complex multiplication. This last step can lead to problems, unless the value of D is sufficiently small, since for large values of D we need to construct the Hilbert class polynomial which has degree
, where h D is the class number of the order of discriminant −D.
Hence, we need to find a small value of D for a given prime p such that one of p + 1 ± W is smooth, where W is the solution to equation (1) . The main cost is in searching for a value of D such that p + 1 ± W is smooth. Due to the size of the numbers involved a naive smoothness test is not enough, and essentially one needs to perform a full factorization using the ECM factorization method.
Security of the DLP
The traditional way to interpret the reduction of the DLP to the DHP is to use the result to examine the security of the discrete logarithm problem in terms of oracle calls to the Diffie-Hellman problem. In such a situation one wishes to balance the number of group operations and Diffie-Hellman oracle calls made in the reduction algorithm. As we mentioned above this can be done by the use of the Baby-Step/Giant-Step algorithm in Step 3 of the reduction above. Doing so results in a complexity of O( √ B · (log p) 3 ) group operations and Diffie-Hellman oracle calls.
Waterhouse [13] determined the possible values of #E(F p ) and showed that for all integers
, there exists an elliptic curve over F p of order d. Furthermore, a theorem by Rück [11] implies that the group structure can be assumed cyclic. This implies the following non-uniform reduction of the DLP to the DHP. For a number p, we define ν(p) to be the minimum of the set of the largest prime factors of the integers d in the interval
This leads to the following theorem:
Theorem 3. For every finite cyclic group G of order |G| = p ei i and such that all multiple prime factors p i of |G| are smaller than a polynomial in log |G|, there exists an algorithm that makes calls to a DH oracle for G and computes discrete logarithms of elements of G in
group operations and calls to the Diffie-Hellman oracle.
A plausible smoothness assumption, see [9, 10] , is that:
This assumption implies the existence of a (log n) O(1) -smooth cyclic elliptic curve over F p for each prime number p. Therefore for every cyclic group G there exists a small piece of information, which depends only on the order of G, that makes breaking the Diffie-Hellman protocol and computing discrete logarithms polynomial-time equivalent in G. This information is a string S consisting of the prime factors p i of |G| and appropriate elliptic curve parameters a i and b i for all p i . (2) is true, then for every cyclic group G = g whose order contains no multiple prime factors greater than a polynomial in log |G|, there exists a string S of length at most 3 log |G| such that when given S, solving the DHP is polynomial-time equivalent to solving the DLP.
Corollary 1. If the smoothness assumption
Using the specific properties of the elliptic curve groups defined in the various standards, we now show the existence of an auxiliary elliptic curve which has very smooth order, i.e. the order simply is a power of two.
Suppose first that the elliptic curve E is defined over a finite field F 2 n , then the theorem of Hasse implies that #E ∈ [2 n + 1 − 2 n/2 , 2 n + 1 + 2 n/2 ]. Furthermore, all the elliptic curve groups in the standard have an order of the form #E = h · p with p a large prime and the cofactor h either 2 or 4. This implies that the prime p itself is contained in the interval
with h = 2 δ , i.e. δ = 1, 2. The theorem by Waterhouse showed that for each
there exists an elliptic curve over F p with group order d. Since p is contained in the interval (3), an easy calculation shows that it is highly likely that d = 2 n−δ is contained in the Hasse-interval
This implies that there exists an auxiliary elliptic curve over F p with group order 2 n−δ . For all characteristic two curves in the SECG list [3] we find that the value of d is in the required interval.
For elliptic curve groups defined over a large prime finite field F q , this reasoning no longer holds. However, to speed up computations, the primes q in use in the standards are of a special form, in particular, most q are very close to a power of 2. Since the co-factor h is either 1 or 4, we conclude that #E = h · p with p close to 2 n for some n. For all the curves over large primes fields to be found in [3] we see that all of those of bit length greater than (or equal to) 160, bar secp256r1 have the property that p is sufficiently close to 2 n for the reasoning to hold. Knowing the existence of an auxiliary elliptic curve group with very smooth order is however not useful in practice since it might require exponential time to construct this elliptic curve. Hence, it is of interest for a given group, proposed for use in a Diffie-Hellman protocol, to also present the best known string S which produces the tightest possible reduction between the DHP and the DLP.
Security of the DHP
We now examine what the reduction means for the security of the Diffie-Hellman protocol in the elliptic curve setting. We want to estimate the number of operations an adversary to the Diffie-Hellman protocol would require, under the assumption that the best algorithm for solving the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem will take √ q operations.
In this case we wish to minimize in the reduction the number of calls to the Diffie-Hellman oracle, at the expense of increasing the number of group operations. Hence, one uses the naive version of Step 3 in the reduction rather than the BabyStep/Giant-Step algorithm. This allows us to obtain a tighter security reduction.
For each elliptic curve in the SECG standards [3] , which includes all the curves in the NIST [2] and the most used ones in the ANSI [1] standards, we searched for the best values for
• The factorized order of the auxiliary elliptic curve (supposed to be smooth),
• The smoothness bound B,
• The parameters a and b of the elliptic curve,
• The number of group operations and the number of calls to the DH-oracle required, using Theorem 2.
The various values for each curve are presented in the Appendix. The Tables 1 and 2 summarize the results. The value of B is the size of the largest prime factor of the order of the auxiliary curve, M represents the number of field multiplications required by the reduction algorithm and DH is the number of Diffie-Hellman oracle calls. The value T represents the tightness of the security reduction. We do not give any values for the larger curves, since we were unable to find a suitable D due to the difficulty of factoring integers of this size.
To interpret what these tables mean, we illustrate with an example. Consider the curve secp256r1: with current knowledge it is believed that to solve the DLP on this curve requires on average 2 128 computational steps. This would imply, given our auxillary curve, that the DHP could not be solved in 2 108 steps and thus solving the DHP on this curve is infeasible with todays computing technology. Thus we can conclude that protocols which depend on the DHP for their security can be safely deployed when using the curve secp256r1.
To obtain a tightness of the security reduction we need to look at two values. There is the cost of field multiplications, represented by log 2 M in Tables 1 and 2 . SECP112R1 49271  24  32  18  38  SECP112R2  232  24  31  18  38  SECP128R1  1147  34  41  18  46  SECP128R2  1099  32  40  18  46  SECP160K1  615  29  36  20  60  SECP160R1  1687  33  41  18  62  SECP160R2  2947  46  53  19  61  SECP192K1 391443  37  44  20  76  SECP192R1 334852  38  46  19  77  SECP224K1 58531  53  62  19  93  SECP224R1 41187  42  51  20  92  SECP256K1 56296  56  65  20  108  SECP256R1 41752  53  62  20  108  SECP384R1 22312  83  91  22  170  SECP521R1 -----Furthermore, we also need to look at
If we assume the existence of an algorithm to solve the DLP on E would take roughly √ #E steps then the value of T DH gives the minimum number of operations which an algorithm to break the DHP would take, assuming M < T DH . Hence, it is the value of T DH which gives the exact security result, given the witness curve we have found. If one could find a better witness elliptic curve then one would obtain a tighter security reduction, and hence a larger value of T DH .
Note that the value of DH is not really affected that much by the smoothness value. The smoothness value mainly affects the number of group operations M . We now argue that it is highly likely for auxiliary elliptic curves to exist which would imply a tight reduction for all elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman problems.
Firstly note that since we are assuming an exponential algorithm for the discrete logarithm problem and we are trying to reduce the number of oracle calls, we do not mind if the number of group operations is exponential, as long as it is less than the eventual estimated number of operations in the Diffie-Hellman algorithm. Hence, if #E factors as a product of three primes of roughly the same order then we would have that the reduction of Theorem 2 would require on average 145 log 2 p + 3 5 + 3 2 log 2 p p 1/3 group operations and 1 2 (31 + 9 log 2 p) log 2 p Diffie-Hellman oracle calls. In particular this would imply
